





















Consider a small developing economy with a manufacturing sector opened to international trade, and an 
agricultural sector having limited, not to say any, access to world markets. We modify the Grossman and 
Helpman’s   influence-driven model of trade policy formation to allow for an endogenously determined 
wage rate in a three-sector economy where the manufacturing sector can lobby policy makers for favorable 
policies.  Beside protectionist policies, namely an import tariff or an export subsidy, we show that the 
owners of the specific factor in agriculture - a non-lobby group - have to bear a consumption tax imposed 
on their products. This would further strengthen the trade protectionist measure, and imply possibly 
undesirable general equilibrium repercussions: there will be a reallocation of labor to the manufacturing 
sector which enjoys an output expansion, an output contraction in the agricultural sector, and a lower 
workers’  ‘’real’’ income.   
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Trade protectionism among nations is as old as the world itself, although gains from free 
trade have theoretically been established a long time ago. Under the “new political 
economy,” trade protection becomes endogenous in the sense that it results from motives 
lying outside the realm of pure economic efficiency. Countries distort trade flows with 
policies that affect the distribution of income to achieve political goals. These distorting 
trade policies could be explained through the political-support function in the analysis of 
Hillman (1982), Long and Vousden (1991); the electoral competition approach of Brock 
and Magee (1978); or the more recent influence-buying approach in the influential work 
of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995).  Trade protection arises from lobbying 
activities, which are characterized as rent-seeking. Lobbying activities are unproductive 
because they transfer income to those who lobby without creating valuable output for the 
rest of the economy. Beside the cost involved in lobbying, there are also welfare loss 
incurred by consumers who are forced to forgo cheaper imports and who must pay higher 
prices for goods produced in the protected sectors.  
 
Protectionism inherent in the trading flows between rich and poor nations is an increasing 
concern in a world in which poverty in developing countries has become alarming. Yet 
poor nations – often producers of foods and agricultural products – have little, if any at 
all, access to these markets in industrialized nations because these countries 
systematically use subsidies to skew the benefits of agricultural trade in their favor.   
According to Watkins and von Braun (2003), high tariffs and other trade barriers are used 
by the industrialized nations to keep out imports. The U.S and the E.U, spend 300 billion 
US dollars in support of their agriculture, a sector that accounts for less than 2% of 
national income, while in developing countries, more than 70% of the population lives   3
and works in rural areas, producing food and agricultural products that account on 
average for 35 % of the national gross domestic product. The tariffs imposed by the U.S. 
and the E.U on agricultural goods are four to five times of those applied to manufactured 
goods. The tariff that the U.S. imposes on ground nuts is in excess of 100% of the 
imported price. In the E.U., the tariffs on dairy products, and worse, on beef, sugar..., are 
equally prohibitive. This would leave billions of people in the world with no market to 
export their agricultural products.  Most of these goods are not traded, because of the 
protectionist measures adopted by industrialized countries to protect their agricultural 
producers. Ironically, the response of poor nations to Western protectionism is also to 
adopt protectionist measures, but in the manufacturing sector – deemed to consist of all 
infant industries – which need to be kept alive in a worldwide competition context.  
 
In this paper, we attempt to analyze the consequences of influence buying in a small 
developing country that is opened for international trade. There are three production 
sectors: a sector producing a freely traded good, a sector producing a traded 
manufacturing good, and a sector producing a non-traded good (the agricultural sector). 
Following Samuelson (1971) and Jones (1971), we assume that the production 
technology in these sectors requires the use of labor and a specific factor. The production 
structure in our model is the same as that of Corden and Neary (1982), who drew on 
Jones, op cit., in formulating a model for analyzing the problem of booming and 
declining sectors in a small open economy. Most of comparative static general-
equilibrium results used in our paper can be found in Corden and Neary. However, in our 
paper, we offer an explanation for the endogenous determination of policies driven by 
lobbying activities. 
 
Among the three production sectors, the first sector produces a traded good, which is 
freely traded and serves as the numéraire. The second is the manufacturing sector, which 
produces a traded good, and the third sector, the agriculture sector, produces a non-traded 
good. The production technology in these sectors requires the use of labor and a specific 
factor. Owners of the specific factor in the production of the traded good is highly   4
concentrated, which makes it easier for them to get organized
3 as a special interest group 
to lobby policy makers for the adoption of favorable trade policies.
4 In contrast, small 
farmers in the non-traded agricultural sector are widely dispersed, and thus they could not 
organize themselves as an interest group to influence policy makers. Workers could not 
exert such influence, either, since there is effectively no institution like labor unions that 
might play a role in setting wages. In exchange for their labor, workers receive a 
competitive wage determined by market conditions. We would like to point out at this 
point that the wage rate is endogenously determined in our analysis, not fixed as in the 
framework of Grossman and Helpman. Trade policies, therefore, have an impact on the 
supply side through intersectoral allocation, in contrast with the analysis of these 
researchers, who considered only the repercussions on the demand side. Under some 
plausible conditions, we are able to show that lobbying activities carried out by the 
owners of the specific factor in the manufacturing sector secure a protectionist trade 
policy through either an import tariff or an export subsidy for this sector. In contrast with 
the result obtained by Grossman and Helpman, which asserts that the non-lobbying group 
should be subsidized, we show that this group – namely the owners of the specific factor 
in agriculture in our model – will have to bear a tax. Thus, the owners of the specific 
factor in the manufacturing sector also benefit indirectly from the consumption tax 
imposed on the consumption of the non-traded good, namely the good produced by the 
agricultural sector. Labor moves to the manufacturing sector, and at the new equilibrium 
there will be an increase in the wage rate, an output expansion in the manufacturing 
sector, an output contraction in the agricultural sector. The rent made by owners of 
specific factor in the manufacturing sector will rise after the new equilibrium has been 
established, while the rent in the numéraire sector will have fallen. As to the rent to the 
owners of the specific factor in the agricultural sector, it may rise or fall, depending on 
the parameters of the model. 
                                                 
3 Mitra (1999) went a step further in considering how lobby groups have been organized prior to their 
activities.    
4 Lobbying activities are akin to a form of corruption in developing countries, with the presumption that in 
these countries bribery is a sort of crime without effective sanction. However, a discussion of corruption 
would involve the morality associated with illegal acts and the need to set up effective penalties against 
these acts. Since we disregard these aspects, it is more appropriate to consider lobbying here as a legal and 
legitimate practice.  
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our model – a three-stage 
game – which is a modified version of the model of Grossman and Helpman, and in 
which we allow for labor mobility across the three sectors of production. Within a 
general equilibrium setting, we solve our problem of endogenous policy formation. In 
Section 3, we present the third stage of this game and elicit the impact of policy changes 
on the pattern of resource allocation. In Section 4, we focus on the endogenous 
determination of trade policy in the second and first stages of our game. Finally, in 
Section 5, we summarize our results and extend our discussion to the question of political 
stability that developing countries should face in choosing trade policy. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
Consider a small open economy with three goods produced from labor and capital. The 
three goods are labeled good 1, good 2, and good 3. Good 1 and good 2 are assumed to be 
traded on world markets, while good 3 is non-traded. For a developing country, good 3 
may either be non exportable local service and/or foods and agricultural products, which 
are heavily protected by their industrialized trading partners. Until these days, repeated 
calls for easing this kind of protection in order to alleviate poverty in developing rural 
economies receive, to say the least, fairly weak echoes. Good 1 is freely traded, and is 
chosen as the numéraire. Let  
0
1 p  and 
0
2 p  denote the world prices of goods 1 and 2. Let 
i p  and   i q  denote, respectively, the domestic prices of good i faced by its producers and 
consumers. Since good 1 serves as the numéraire and is freely trade, we have 
= = 1 1 q p 1
0
1 = p . For good 2, the government can impose an import tariff (or an export 
subsidy) 0 2 ≥ τ . In this case,  . 2
0
2 2 2 τ + = = p q p  For good 3, the non-traded good, we shall 
assume that a consumption tax (or subsidy),  3 τ 0 ≥  (if   3 τ 0 ≤ ), is imposed on its 
consumers. In this case,  . 3 3 3 τ + = p q  A combination ( ) , 3 2 τ τ  will be referred to as a 
policy. 
   6
On the production side, labor is assumed to be homogenous and perfectly mobile. Its 
fixed supply is denoted by  . L  Capital is sector-specific, and the capital stock in sector i 
is denoted by  . 3 , 2 , 1 , = i Ki  The output of good i is given by  ( ) i i i i K L F Y , = , where  i L  is 
the labor input and  i F  is a standard neoclassical production function that exhibits 
constant returns to scale. The rent accrued to the factor-specific capital is then given by 
, i i i L Y p ω −  where ω is the prevailing wage rate. Sector i solves the following rent-
maximization problem: 
(1)  ( ) [] ( ), , , max ω ω i i i i i i i L p L K L F p
i Π = −                            ). 3 , 2 , 1 ( = i  
We shall let  ) , ( ω i i p L  denote the labor input used by sector  , i  which is the solution of the 
preceding rent maximization problem and  ( ) i i i i i i K p L F p Y ), , ( ) , ( ω ω =  denote this sector’s 
output. 
 
Let  N  be the size of the population of the small open economy. We shall assume that N  
is a continuum of measure 1. Each individual in the population is assumed to own only 
one type of input. We refer to group i as the group of individuals who own the specific 
factor i k . For each  , 3 , 2 , 1 = i  let  i γ  denote the size of group i relative to the total 
population. The workers – as a group – will be referred to as group 4. If  , 4 γ < L  then 
L − 4 γ  represents the number of individuals who are either unemployed and/or working 
in the informal sector. Even being identified as a common feature in a developing 
economy, this problem, however, is not the subject of our analysis. Thus we assume that 
. 4 γ = L  Thus groups 1, 2, and 3 obtain their incomes through the ownership of sector-
specific capital, while group 4 obtains its income by selling its labor. We expect that  4 γ is 
large relative to . 3 , 2 , 1 , = i i γ   
 
A group, such as the owners of a specific input, who see their income tied to the price of 
the price of output that this specific input helps to produce, have the incentive to lobby 
policy makers for policies that enhance their income. In many developing economies, the 
owners of the specific input used in infant manufacturing sectors often become organized   7
as a special-interest group to exert such lobbying pressures on the government. This 
paper will concentrate on this problem, with group 2 as the focus of our attention. In the 
model we formulate, the individuals who constitute group 2 organize themselves and 
offer political contributions to the government to buy influence. In this influence-driven 
approach, the political contributions serve to influence the policies implemented by the 
government.  
 
We suppose that individual preferences are identical and represented by the following 
quasi-linear utility function:  , ) ( ) , , (
3
2 1 3 2 1 ∑ = + →
i i i x u x x x x where  i x  is the consumption 
of good i and  i u  is the sub-utility function associated with the consumption of good 
. 3 , 2 , = i i  We assume that  i u is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly 
concave. An individual with an income m at his disposal solves the following utility 
maximization problem: 















+ − ∑ ∑
= =
 





i ix q m  
 
Assuming that the above problem has an interior solution, the following first-order 
condition characterizes the demand for good  : 3 , 2 , = i i  
(3)  . 0 ) ( ' = − i i i q x u  
Letting  ) ( i i q x  be the value of  i x  that solves (2). As defined,  ) ( i i q x  is the individual’s 
demand for good  , 3 , 2 , = i i  as a function of its consumer price. The indirect utility 
function of an individual is then given by 
(3) ), , ( ) , , ( 2 1 2 1 q q s m m q q v + =  
where 





3 2 ) ( ) ( ) , (
i
i i i i i i q x q q x u q q s  
is the consumer surplus enjoyed by this individual. 
   8
The game of endogenous policy formation has three stages and its extensive form is as 
follows.  
 
In the first stage, group 2 lobbies the government by communicating to the policy makers 
a contingent payment schedule  ), , ( ) , ( : 3 2 2 3 2 2 τ τ τ τ C C → where ) , ( 3 2 2 τ τ C  represents the 
payment that it is willing to make to the government if the policy  ) , ( 3 2 τ τ  is implemented. 
The payment  ) , ( 3 2 2 τ τ C  – also called the political contribution in the literature – is 
expressed in terms of the numéraire, and is valued by policy makers because it can be 
used as a political support in financing future election or simply put away for personal 
use.  
 
In the second stage of the game, the policy makers take as given the contingent payment 
schedule  2 C  and implement a policy according to some criterion which depends on the 
payment as well as on some measure of social welfare. We would like to point out at this 
point that the game we formulate is that of a principal-agent problem – with group 2 as 
the principal and the policy makers as the agent – because we assume that neither group 3 
nor group 4 is organized as a special-interest group. Indeed, if workers are represented by 
a strong labor union, and/or if owners of the specific factor used in the food and 
agricultural production organize themselves as a special-interest group, then all these 
groups will compete in lobbying the policy makers. In this case, the game is one of many 
principals against a common agency,
5 which could be analyzed with the help of the 
theoretical machinery developed by Bernheim and Whinston, op. cit. 
 
In the third stage of the game, the producers take as given the policy implemented by the 
policy makers in the second stage and carry out their production plans to maximize profit. 
As for consumers, they make their consumption decisions and these decisions depend on 
their income as well as the prices they face. Group 2 will then make the contingent 
payment it promised the government in the first stage.  
 
                                                 
5 We have undertaken this task in our mimeo “ Endogenous Trade Policies with General Equilibrium 
Repercussions,’’ 1998.   9
Suppose that  ) , ( 3 2 τ τ  is the policy implemented by the policy makers in the second stage. 
The general equilibrium of the small open economy is characterized by the following 
market-clearing conditions: 
(4)  , ) , ( ) , ( ) , 1 ( 4 3 3 2
0
2 2 1 γ ω ω τ ω = + + + p L p L L   
(5)  ). , ( ) ( 3 3 3 3 3 ω τ p Y p x = +  
Together, (4) and (5) constitute a system of two equations in the two unknowns  3 p  and 
. ω  We shall denote by  ) , ( 3 2 3 τ τ p  and  ) , ( 3 2 τ τ ω  the equilibrium price of the non-traded 
good and the equilibrium wage rate that are induced by the policy  ). , ( 3 2 τ τ   
 
The net tax revenue collected under the policy  ) , ( 3 2 τ τ  is 




2 2 2 3 2 τ τ τ τ τ τ ω τ τ τ τ τ + + + − + = p x p Y p x T  
We shall assume that the net tax revenue collected by the government is redistributed 
equally to all the individuals in the economy. This assumption ensures that the public 
budget is always balanced. 
If  ) , ( 3 2 τ τ  is the policy implemented by the policy makers, then the payoff of group 1 is 
given by: 
(7)  () ( ) [ ]. ) , ( , ) , ( ) , ( , 1 ) , ( 3 3 2 3 2
0
2 3 2 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 τ τ τ τ τ τ γ τ τ ω τ τ + + + + Π = p p s T W  
The gross payoff of group 2 – before the political contributions are made – is given by 
(8)  ( ) ( ) [ ], ) , ( , ) , ( ) , ( , ) , ( 3 3 2 3 2
0
2 3 2 2 3 2 2
0
2 2 3 2 2 τ τ τ τ τ τ γ τ τ ω τ τ τ + + + + + Π = p p s T p W  
and its net payoff by    ). , ( ) , ( 3 2 2 3 2 2 τ τ τ τ C W − As for group 3 and group 4, their payoffs are 
given, respectively, by 
(9)  () ( ) [ ], ) , ( , ) , ( ) , ( ), , ( ) , ( 3 3 2 3 2
0
2 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 τ τ τ τ τ τ γ τ τ ω τ τ τ τ + + + + Π = p p s T p W  
and 
(10)  ( ) [ ]. ) , ( , ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( 3 3 2 3 2
0
2 3 2 3 2 4 3 2 4 τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ ω γ τ τ + + + + = p p s T W  
The gross social welfare – before the political contributions are made – is then given by 
(11)  () ( ) ( )
() , ) , ( , ) , ( ) , (                           
) , ( ), , ( ) , ( , ) , ( , 1 ) , (
3 3 2 3 2
0
2 3 2 3 2 4
3 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 2
0
2 2 3 2 1 3 2
τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ ω γ
τ τ ω τ τ τ τ ω τ τ τ ω τ τ
+ + + + +
Π + + Π + Π =
p p s T
p p W
   10
and the net social welfare – as a function of the contingent political contribution schedule 
2 C  and the policy  ) , ( 3 2 τ τ is then given by  ). , ( ) , ( 3 2 2 3 2 τ τ τ τ C W −  
 
The payoff of the government is assumed to be given by 
(12) 
). , ( ) , ( ) 1 (                           
) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , , (
3 2 3 2 2
3 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 2
τ τ τ τ λ
τ τ τ τ τ τ λ τ τ
W C
C W C C
+ − =
− + = Γ
 
In (12), λ  represents the weight assigned to the political component of payoff. Note that 
in the payoff function, net social welfare receives a weight equal to 1. In order for the 
government to accept political contribution, it is necessary that  . 1 > λ  If  , 1 ≤ λ  a transfer 
from any group to the government will decrease the latter player’s payoff. 
 
Now let  
(13)  () ). , , ( max arg ) ( 2 3 2 , 2 3 2 C C τ τ τ τ Γ = ℜ  
As defined,  ) ( 2 C ℜ  is the set of policies that are best against  . 2 C  The point-to-set map 
) ( : 2 2 C C ℜ → ℜ  represents the best-response correspondence of the government. We are 
now ready for a formal definition of the equilibrium of the principal-agent problem. 
 















2 , , τ τ C  is a Nash equilibrium for the game of 
endogenous policy formation if the following conditions are satisfied : 






2 C ℜ ∈ τ τ  
  (b) For any feasible contingent payment schedule  2 C  of group 2, we have 










2 2 2 3 2 τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ C W C W C − ≥ − ℜ ∈  
 




2 τ τ  is a best response to  ,
*
2 C  while condition (b) asserts 
that 
*
2 C  is a best strategy that the principal can adopt. 
 
3. THE THIRD STAGE OF THE GAME: TAX POLICIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION   11
 
In this section we analyze the third stage of the game. Suppose then that  ) , ( 3 2 τ τ  is the tax 
policy implemented by policy makers in the second stage. To analyze the impact of tax 
policies on the pattern of resource allocation, we shall investigate the behavior of the 
system made up of the two market-clearing conditions (4) and (5). 
 
First, let us look at the partial equilibrium in the market for the non-traded good. Suppose 
then that the wage rate is given. Given the wage rate, the market supply of the non-traded 
good is  ) , ( 3 3 3 3 ω p Y p →  and the market demand for this good is  ). ( 3 3 3 3 τ + → p x p   
The market-clearing condition for the non-traded good is  ). , ( ) ( 3 3 3 3 3 3 ω τ p Y p x = +  Let 
) , ( ~
3 3 τ ω p  denote the price that clears this market, given the wage rate ω  and the tax  . 3 τ  
The determination of the partial equilibrium in the market for the non-traded good, given 
the wage rate and the tax on the consumption of this good. We have the following 
comparative static results concerning the partial equilibrium in the market for the non-
traded good.  
 
First, note that an increase in the wage rate shifts the supply curve of the non-traded good 
upward, but has no impact on the market demand curve for this good. The new partial 
equilibrium involves a higher producer price, i.e., a higher value of  , 3 p  and a lower 
output of the non-traded good. A lower output means a lower demand for labor because 
the capital stock in the non-traded good sector is sector-specific. We have just shown that 
) , ( ~
3 3 τ ω ω p →  is increasing, but  ( ) ω τ ω ω ), , ( ~
3 3 3 p Y →  and  ( ) ω τ ω ω ), , ( ~
3 3 3 p L →  are both 
decreasing. 
 
Second, note that an increase in  , 3 τ  the consumption tax on the non-traded good, leaves 
its supply curve unchanged, but shifts its demand curve downward. The new equilbrium 
involves a lower price, a lower quantity, and a fortiori a lower demand for labor by the 
non-traded good sector. That is,  ), , ( ~
3 3 3 τ ω τ p →   ( ), ), , ( ~
3 3 3 3 ω τ ω τ p Y →  and 
() ω τ ω τ ), , ( ~
3 3 3 3 p L →  are all decreasing.   12
 
Using the first comparative static result, we can assert that the aggregate demand for 
labor, namely 
( ), ), , ( ~ ) , ( ) , 1 ( ) ,. , ( : ,.) , ( 3 3 3 2
0
2 2 1 3 2 3 2 ω τ ω ω τ ω ω τ τ ω τ τ p L p L L L L + + + = →   
is strictly decreasing from  ∞ +  to 0 as ω  rises from 0 to  . ∞ +  Hence by continuity there 
exists a unique wage rate, say  ), , ( 3 2 τ τ ω  that clears the labor market. The determination 
of the equilibrium wage rate, is a function of the policy implemented. When the wage 
rate ) , ( 3 2 τ τ ω  prevails, the equilibrium price of the non-traded good is given by 
). , ( ~ ) , ( 3 3 3 2 3 τ ω τ τ p p =  The general equilibrium for the small open economy that is 
induced by the tax policy  ) , ( 3 2 τ τ  is now completely determined. 
 
LEMMA 1: An increase in the tariff on the import of good 2, ceteris paribus, raises the  
wage rate and the price of the non-traded good. Labor moves out of sectors 1 and 3 into 
sector  2, causing the former sectors to contract and the latter sector to expand. 
Furthermore, after the new equilibrium has been established, the rents made by the 
owners of the specific input in sector 2 will have risen, while the rents accruing to the 
specific input in sector 1 will have declined. As for the rents accruing to the specific input 
in sector 3, it is not clear whether they will have risen or fallen.. 
 
PROOF: A rise in  2 τ  a fortiori raises  , 2
0
2 τ + p  the domestic price of good 2. At any given 
wage rate, the rise in the price of good 2 will induce the domestic producers of this good 
to raise their output. Because capital is sector specific, a rise in output can only be 
attained by increasing the labor input. Thus a rise in  2 τ  will shift the curve 
), , ( 2
0
2 2 ω τ ω + → p L  the demand for labor by the non-traded good sector upward. On the 
other hand, a rise in  2 τ  has no impact on the demand curve for labor by sector 1 and the 
demand curve for labor by the non-traded good sector. Thus at the initial equilibrium 
wage rate and immediately after the rise in  , 2 τ  there will be an excess demand for labor 
in the small open economy. To clear the labor market after the rise in  , 2 τ  the wage rate 
must rise. The rise in the equilibrium wage rate induces the sector producing the   13
numéraire as well as the non-traded good sector to decrease their labor inputs, which a 
fortiori implies a rise in the demand for labor by sector 2. 
 
The new higher equilibrium wage rate that is induced by a rise in  2 τ  clearly worsens the 
situation of the owners of the specific input used in the production of the numéraire. As 
for the owners of the specific input in sector 3, the rents they obtain will be higher. To see 
why, note that the rents accruing to the specific input in sector 2 is 
). , ( / ) ( 2 2 2 2 2 2
0
2 L K L F K p ∂ ∂ +τ  The rise in sector 2’s demand for labor raises the marginal 
product of the specific input. This result together with the rise in  2
0
2 τ + p  imply a rise in 
the rents accruing to the specific input in sector 2. As for sector 3, a lower labor input 
means a lower output and a higher price for the non-traded good. A rise in 2 τ thus causes 
the non-traded good sector to contract. Although the non-traded good sector contracts, the 
price of this good rises. Thus it is not clear whether the rents accruing to the specific 
input in this sector rise or fall. If the contraction is dramatic, we could expect the income 
of the owners of the specific input in this sector to fall.                 ■ 
 
The impact of a rise in the tax on the consumption of the non-traded good is given in the 
following lemma:  
 
LEMMA 2: A rise in the tax on the consumption of the non-traded good, ceteris paribus, 
depresses the wage rate and causes the producer price of this good to fall. Both sectors 1 
and 2 expand at the expense of sector 3. Furthermore, the rents accruing to the specific 
inputs in sector 1 and 2 both rise, while the rents accruing to the specific input in sector 1 
decline. 
 
PROOF : Recall from our comparative static analysis of the partial equilibrium in the non-
traded good sector that a rise in  3 τ  will shift the demand curve for labor by this sector 
downward, but has no impact on the demand curves for labor by the other two sectors. 
Hence a rise in the consumption tax in the non-traded good sector will shift the aggregate 
demand for labor downward, causing the equilibrium wage rate to fall. The lower wage   14
rate will induce sectors 1 and 2 to expand because the prices for goods 1 and 2 do not 
change. Also, the lower wage rate will cause the rents in these sectors to rise. 
 
As for the impact on sector 3, a lower wage rate shifts the supply curve of the non-traded 
good downward. The rise in the tax on the consumption of this good will also shift the 
demand curve for this good downward. Hence a rise in the tax on the consumption of the 
non-traded good will cause its price to fall. Furthermore, because a rise in the tax on the 
consumption of the non-traded good causes the demand for labor in this sector to fall, the 
marginal product of capital in the non-traded good sector will be lower under the new 
equilibrium. Hence  ( ), )) , ( ), , ( ( , / ) , ( 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 τ τ ω τ τ τ τ p L K K F K p ∂ ∂  the rents accruing 
to the specific input used in the production of the non-traded good, will decline when the 
tax on the consumption of this good rises.  ■ 
 
We wish to emphasize that as a result of lobbying, it will be shown that the policy 
authority would enhance the protection of the traded sector. This protection, either 
through import-tariff or export subsidy, will be strengthened by the imposition of a 
consumption tax on the non-traded good. The overall effect of such policy is obtained 
from the combination of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, which exhibit respectively the partial 
effect of the protectionist policy and the consumption tax ( see also Corden and Neary, 
op.cit.  ).   
 
4. THE ENDOGENOUS DETERMINATION OF POLICIES 
 
4.1. Welfare Maximization 
 
If policy makers’ objective is to maximize social welfare, then the government solves the 
following maximization problem: 
(14)  () . ) , ( max 0 3 2 , 3 2 µ τ τ τ τ = W  
The following first-order conditions characterize a solution of (14): 
(15)  , 0 )] , ( ˆ [ )] , ( ˆ [ ) , ( 3 3 2 3 1 2 3 2 2 1 3 2 1 = + = τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ Y D Z D W D    15
(16)  . 0 )] , ( ˆ [ )] , ( ˆ [ ) , ( 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 = + = τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ Y D Z D W D  
In (15) and (16), we have let 





2 2 3 2 2 τ τ ω τ τ τ τ + − + = p Y p x Z  
and 
  )) , ( ), , ( ( ) , ( ˆ
3 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 τ τ ω τ τ τ τ p Y Y =  
denote, respectively, the equilibrium level of the import of good 2 and the equilibrium 
output of the non-traded good under the policy  ). , ( 3 2 τ τ  See the appendix for the detailed 
calculations leading to (15) and (16). 
 
Now define 
  )]. , ( ˆ )][ , ( ˆ [ )] , ( ˆ )][ , ( ˆ [ ) , ( 3 2 3 1 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 1 3 2 τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ Y D Z D Y D Z D − = ∆  
Now as  2 τ  rises, the demand for good 2 declines. Furthermore, according to Lemma 1, its 
supply goes up as  2 τ rises. Hence  . 0 ) , ( ˆ
3 2 2 1 < τ τ Z D  Also, by Lemma 1, we have 
. 0 ) , ( ˆ
3 2 3 1 < τ τ Y D  Next, recall from Lemma 2 that when  3 τ  rises the output of good 2 goes 
up, but the output of good 3 goes down. Also, rise in  3 τ  alone does not affect the demand 
for good 2. Hence  0 ) , ( ˆ
3 2 2 2 < τ τ Z D  and  . 0 )] , ( ˆ
3 2 3 2 < τ τ Y D  Without further restrictions, we 
cannot determine the sign of  ) , ( 3 2 τ τ ∆  unambiguously. If we let  ) , ( 2 2 , 2 τ τ η i  and 
) , ( 2 2 , 3 τ τ η i  denote, respectively, the elasticity of  ) , ( ˆ
3 2 2 τ τ Z  and the elasticity of  ) , ( ˆ
3 2 3 τ τ Y  
with respect to  , i τ  then  ) , ( 3 2 τ τ ∆  can be rewritten as follows : 
 
.
) , ( ) , (
) , ( ) , (
1 )] , ( ˆ )][ , ( ˆ [                      
)] , ( ˆ )][ , ( ˆ [
)] , ( ˆ )][ , ( ˆ [
1 )] , ( ˆ )][ , ( ˆ [ ) , (
3 2 3 , 3 3 2 2 , 2
3 2 2 , 3 3 2 3 , 2
3 2 3 2 3 2 2 1
3 2 3 2 3 2 2 1
3 2 3 1 3 2 2 2

















τ τ η τ τ η
τ τ η τ τ η
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ
Y D Z D
Y D Z D
Y D Z D
Y D Z D
 




3 2 2 , 2




and   16
(18)   . 1
) , (
) , (
3 2 3 , 3




Thus if the inequalities (17) and (18) are satisfied, then  . 0 ) , ( 3 2 > ∆ τ τ  In this case, the 
only values of  2 τ  and  3 τ  that satisfy the system constituted by (15) and (16) are 
. 0 3 2 = =τ τ  We summarize the results just obtained in the following proposition : 
 
PROPOSITION 1 : Suppose that (17) and (18) hold, i.e., for the excess demand of good 2 
and for the supply of the non-traded good, the own-price effect dominates the cross-price 
effect of a policy change. Then  ), , ( 3 2 τ τ ∆  the discriminant of the system constituted by 
(15) and (16), is positive, and the policy that maximizes social welfare is that of no 
government intervention. 
 
4.2. Determination of Endogenous Policy 
 
If ) , ( 3 2 τ τ  is a policy that group 2 wishes the government to implements, then the 
shortfall in the social welfare component of the government’s payoff is  ). , ( 3 2 0 τ τ µ W −  
Here we recall that  0 µ  – as defined by (13) – the government’s  reservation payoff and 
) , ( 3 2 τ τ W  is the social welfare before political contributions are made. To induce the 
government into implementing this policy, group 2 must promise a payment of at least 
() ). 1 /( ) , ( 3 2 0 − − λ τ τ µ W  The net payoff of group 2 – after the payment has been made – 












W  Hence the policy that the owners of the 
specific input used in the production of good 2 is the solution of the following 
maximization problem : 
(19)  () .
1
) , (
) , ( max 2
3 2 0
3 2 2 , 3 2 µ
λ
τ τ µ










The following first-order conditions characterize a solution of (19)   17
(20)   , 0 ) , (
1
1




τ τ W D W D  
(21)  . 0 ) , (
1
1




τ τ W D W D  
Using the expressions for  ) , ( 3 2 1 τ τ W D  and  ) , ( 3 2 2 τ τ W D , which are given by the right 
sides of the first equalities in (15) and (16), respectively, and letting  , 0 1 ˆ < − = λ λ we can 
rewrite these first-order conditions as follows. 
(22)  ), , ( ˆ )] , ( ˆ [ )] , ( ˆ [ 3 2 2 1 3 3 2 3 1 2 3 2 2 1 τ τ λ τ τ τ τ τ τ W D Y D Z D = +  
(23)  ). , ( ˆ )] , ( ˆ [ )] , ( ˆ [ 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 τ τ λ τ τ τ τ τ τ W D Y D Z D = +  
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In (24) and (25), the elaticities  , 3 , 2 , ), , ( 2 1 , = j i j i τ τ η  are as defined before, while 
, 3 , 2 ), , ( 2 1 , 2 = j j τ τ ς  denotes the elasticity of  ) , ( 3 2 2 τ τ W  with respect to  . 3 , 2 , = j j τ   
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Let us now determine the sign of 
*
2 τ  and  .
*
3 τ  In the same manner that we expect the 
inequalities (17) and (18) to hold, we should also expect that for the gross payoff of 
group 2, the own-price elasticity will dominate the cross-price elasticity, i.e.,  
(26)  ). , ( ) , ( 3 2 2 , 2 3 2 3 , 2 τ τ ς τ τ ς <  
Hence when (17), (18), and (26) hold, the expressions inside the square brackets on the 
last lines of (24) and (25) will both be positive. Next, recall from Proposition 1 that when 




2,τ τ ∆  will be positive. Also, recall from Lemma 2 
that  . 0 ) , ( ˆ *
3
*
2 3 2 < τ τ Y D  Because  , 0 ˆ < λ  
*





2 2 1 τ τ W D  is positive or negative. 
 
Now  ), , ( 3 2 2 τ τ W  the gross payoff of group 2, has three components : rents, government 
transfer, and consumer surplus. When  2 τ rises, the rents component also rise, according to 
Lemma 1. A rise in  2 τ  a fortiori means a rise in the domestic price of good 2, causing the 
consumer surplus associated with the consumption of this good to decline. Also, 
according to Lemma 1, a rise in  2 τ  will induce a rise in the consumer price of the non-
traded good, causing the consumer surplus associated with the consumption of this good 
to decline. As for the government transfer component, if good 2 is exported, a rise in 
2 τ means an increase in the subsidy given to the export of this commodity, resulting in a 
heavier tax burden on each individual of the small open economy. If good 2 is imported, 
a rise in  2 τ raises the tariff revenues collected on the imports of this commodity. 
Furthermore, if the tax on the consumption of the non-traded good is positive, the decline 
in its production – induced by a rise in  2 τ  – will lead to a lower level of tax revenues 
collected from this sector. On the other hand, if the consumption of the non-traded good 
is subsidized, then a rise in  2 τ  will reduce the subsidy given to the consumption of this 
good. The overall impact of a rise in  2 τ  on the payoff of group 2 depends on the net 
effects of these conflicting movements of the three components in the gross payoff of 
group 2. However, when the ownership of the specific input in sector 2 is highly 
concentrated, i.e., when  2 γ  is very small, we can ignore the government transfer and the   19
consumer surplus components in the gross payoff for good 2. In this case, the gross 
payoff of group 2 can be approximated by the rents accruing to the specific input in 




2 2 1 > τ τ W D  We have just shown that if the ownership of the 
specific input in sector 2 is highly concentrated and if the own-price effects dominate the 
cross-price effects, then the owners of the specific input in sector 2 will be able to lobby 
policy makers either for a tariff or an export subsidy for good 2. In general, if 
, 0 ) , ( 3 2 2 1 < τ τ W D  then it does not pay for group 2 to organize, and we will not witness any 
lobbying activities by the owners of the specific input in sector 2. 
 
As for  ,
*




2 2 2 τ τ W D  According to Lemma 
2, a rise in the tax on the consumption of the non-traded good depresses the wage rate and 
cause the producer price of the non-traded good to fall. Both sectors 1 and 2 expand at the 
expense of sector 3. For the owners of the specific input in sector 2, they see the rents 
they obtain rise with  . 3 τ  The consumer surplus that they obtain from the consumption of 
good 2 also rises. However, it is not clear whether the surplus that they obtain from the 
consumption of the non-traded good rises or falls because the consumer price of this 
commodity goes up, but its demand goes down. As in the analysis on the sign of  ,
*
2 τ  if 
the ownership of the specific input in sector 2 is highly concentrated, then we will have 




2 2 2 > τ τ W D  which leads to  . 0
*
3 > τ  We have the following results : 
 
PROPOSITION 2:  Suppose that the inequalities (17), (18), and (26) hold, i.e., the own-
price effects dominate the cross-price effects. If the ownership of the specific input in 
sector 2 is highly concentrated, then through its lobbying activities, group 2 will manage 
to obtain support for its industry, either through an import tariff or an export subsidy. 
Furthermore, its lobbying activities will induce the government to impose a tax on the 
consumption of the non-traded good. Also, the lobbying activities of group 2 result in the 
expansion of sector 2 and a contraction of sector 3. As for sector 1, it is not clear whether 
it expands or contracts. 
   20
PROOF :  The first two statements of the proposition have been established. To establish 
the last two, let us imagine that starting from the initial state of non-intervention, policy 
maker implement first the policy  ,
*
2 τ  then the policy  .
*
3 τ  According to Lemma 1, when 
2 τ  rises from 0 to  ,
*
2 τ  sector 2 expands, but sector 1 and sector 3 contract. The next 
policy movement from  ) 0 , (
*




2 τ τ  causes sector 2 to expand further; sector 1 to 
expand; and sector 3 to contract further. The overall impacts of the lobbying activities of 
group 2 are a net expansion of sector 2 and a net contraction of sector 3. As for the net 
impact on the sector that produces the numéraire, it is not clear whether this sector 
expands or contracts.                           ■ 
  
4.3. A Solution of the Endogenous Policy Problem 
 




2 τ τ  found in Section 4.2 maximizes the net payoff of group 2 while 
respecting the participating constraint. Group 2 extracts all the surplus generated by the 
participation of the government. A contingent payment schedule that allows group 2 to 
maximize its net payoff is  




2 µ τ τ τ τ τ τ − = → W C C   
 
Bernheim and Whinston, op. cit., label such a contingent payment schedule a truthful 
strategy. In adopting the strategy represented by (27), group 2 only aims for a net payoff 
of  . 2 µ  More precisely, if its gross payoff is less than  , 2 µ  then it will not make any 
political contribution. On the other hand, any payoff in excess of  2 µ  will be offered to 
the government as political contributions. For the government, a best response to 
*











2 τ τ C  is a truthful Nash equilibrium for the game of 
endogenous trade policy formation. 
 
 5. WHAT IS NEXT AFTER LOBBYING?   
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For a small open developing economy where the practice of buying political influence – 
through either corruption, bribery, gifts etc ... – is relatively widespread, policy formation 
is endogenous in that it results from the interplay of special-interest groups’ advantages 
and policy makers’ gains from the contributions made by the special-interest groups. We 
adopt the influence-driven approach of Grossman and Helpman to analyze the question of 
endogenous trade policy for an economy with three production sectors – a sector 
producing a good which is freely traded and which is taken to be the numéraire, a 
manufacturing sector producing a traded good, and an agricultural sector producing a 
non-traded good because it has no access to international markets. Neither workers nor  
owners of the specific factor in agriculture – group 3 and group 4 in our model – could 
get organized as special-interest groups to lobby policy makers. We assume that lobbying 
activities will only be carried out by group 2 – the owners of the specific factor in the 
manufacturing sector – and show that lobbying would secure a protectionist trade policy 
through either an import tariff or an export subsidy in this sector. Furthermore, this group 
also benefits from the consumption tax imposed on the consumption of the non-traded   
agricultural products. Labor moves to the manufacturing sector, and as a result, an output 
expansion in the manufacturing sector, and an output contraction in the agricultural 
sector. The rent made by the owners of the specific factor in the manufacturing sector 
will rise after the new equilibrium has been established. As to the rent made by the 
owners of the specific factor in the agricultural sector, it may rise or fall, depending on 
the values of the parameters of the model. As for the wage rate, it goes up after an 
increase in the tariff in manufacturing sector (Lemma 1), but goes down after the 
imposition of a consumption tax in the agricultural sector (Lemma 2),  thus all in all may 
rise or fall as a result of lobbying.  
 
What will be happening if we allow the owners of the specific factor in agriculture to 
participate in the lobbying game of policy formation? Obviously, their interests will go 
against the adoption of the consumption tax on agricultural products. Government 
officials, now the common agency, will see competitive bids from many lobbies, and the 
policies resulting from this process would be, from the viewpoint of the lobbies involved,   22
more “balanced.” This task has been undertaken,
6 and there will not be a unique Truthful 
Nash Equilibrium, as in the present paper. In a developing nation, farmers often work on 
little plots of land that geographically spread all around the countryside. This certainly 
does not help in allowing farmers to become organized as a special-interest group. 
 
We may ask the same question with regard to the workers and try to find out how they 
behave as an organized lobby. Each worker sees her wage changed at the new 
equilibrium because of lobbying activities by the owners of the specific factor in the 
manufacturing sector,  receives a lump-sum transfer, but has to pay higher prices for their 
consumption of manufacturing and agricultural products, thus enjoying a lower consumer 
surplus. Her “real income”, which is represented by equation (3), should fall in 
comparison with that obtained in the absence of lobbying, i.e., under non-intervention 
(Proposition 1). If we assume that workers could engage in the influence-driven game, 
they will obviously lobby for no policy intervention, thus lessen the impact of lobbying 
activities carried out by owners of the specific factor in the manufacturing sector. 
However, in the vast majority of developing countries, workers are not organized. When 
workers are organized, they tend to constitute small groups working in urban cities, not in 
rural areas.  
 
What is left for workers as a means to defend their interest? In a democracy where the   
majority voting is the rule to elect the government, workers might express their interest 
through the periodic polls. Since the “’real income’’ of the median voter declines as a 
result of trade policies induced from lobbying activities, voters would never have any 
advantage to keep the ruling government in power. This is one among the multiple causes 
of endemic instability inherent in any democratic regime in rural developing countries. 
And if workers do not believe in the voting process, they are left only with sporadic 
manifestations through unrest. This probably offers an explanation for the casual 
observation that so many totalitarian governments and political dictatorship exist in some 
developing nations. The current call from the industrialized countries in the West for 
implementing political democracy and fighting against poverty in developing nations is 
                                                 
6 See footnote 5.   23
perhaps a lulling melody in the desert, unless they put an end to their protectionist 
policies in agriculture, eliminate all insidious trade barriers, and open their agricultural 
markets to the poor countries. As our analysis suggests, free trade would certainly help 




THE DERIVATIONS OF EQUATIONS (15) AND (16) 
 
Substituting the expression for the total tax revenue collected and the expression for total 
consumer surplus into the expression of gross social welfare, we obtain 
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Applying Hotelling lemma to the profits functions of the two sectors; using the fact that 
the marginal utilities of good 2 and 3 are equal, respectively, to their prices; and using the 
market-clearing conditions for labor and the non-traded good, we can rewrite (A.1) as 
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We can rewrite (A.4) as 
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which is (15) in Section 4.1. 
 
Differentiating (A.1) with respect to  , 3 τ , we obtain 
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